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Abstract
The proposed Gargill purchase of Continental Grain's grain merchandising business would join the world's
two largest grain and oilseed exporters. Many farm organizations, other participants in the industry,
regulators, and policy makers have expressed concerns about the proposed acquisition. We will describe the
businesses and market volumes involved, the locations where potential losses of competition from their
combination may be important or insignificant, and discuss potential increases in efficiency or effectiveness
which might be expected from such a business combination. Ultimately, the questions regarding the
acquisition are likely to boil down to comparing the potential benefits and costs, overall, and we will briefly
consider both.
Disciplines
Agribusiness | Agricultural Economics | Economic Policy | Industrial Organization
This report is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/322
Cargill's Acquisition of Continental Grain's
Grain Merchandising Business
Marvin Hayenga and Robert Wisner
Department ofEconomics
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa 50011
Staff paper #312
January, 1999
Abstract
What are the advantages ofconcerns raised regarding the Cargill acquisition of
Continental Grain company's grain merchandising business? The largest grain exporter
acquiring the second largest exporter has raised some concerns regarding potential loss of
competition, butalso may make these firms with excess capacity more efficient and
effective in competing^ for a larger U.S. share ofthe world market. This white paper pulls
together the relevant data which was quickly available and provides some analysis which
may prove useful in thedialog as the pros and cons of this acquisition are debated.
Cargill's Acquisition of Continental Grain's
Grain Merchandising Business
Marvin Hayenga and Robert Wisner
The proposed Gargill purchase of Continental Grain's grain merchandising business
would join the world's two largest grain and oilseed exporters. Many farm organizations,
other participants in the industry, regulators, and policy makers have expressed concerns
about the proposed acquisition. We will describe the businesses and market volumes
involved, the locations where potential losses of competition from their combination may
be important or insignificant, and discuss potential increases in efficiency or effectiveness
which might be expected from such a business combination. Ultimately, the questions
regarding the acquisition are likely to boil down to comparing the potential benefits and
costs, overall, and we will briefly consider both.
In a relatively brief one-month study, a team of economists from several universities'
interviewed a number of knowledgeable members of the grain merchandising and
exporting industry in the United States. Questions were posed regarding possible areas of
concern, and opinions regarding potential effects on competition in the grain
merchandising industry. Industry participants were asked for estimated storage and
loading capacities for their firms and leading competitors, and their estimates of
merchandising volume or market shares owned or controlled by leading competitors.
Several strategic locations important in the grain merchandising business were selected
for more in-depth analysis due to their influence in the export or river terminal marketing
systems, and the futures markets which play a very important role in price discovery and
risk management in the grainmerchandising industry.
Thus, we emphasize interior barge loading locations on the Illinois (the delivery location
for the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) com and soybean futures markets beginning in
2000), Mississippi and Ohio rivers, futures market delivery locations currently at
Chicago, Toledo, and Kansas City, and the high volume export locations on theEast and
West coasts. The information collected comes from a number of government, trade
publication and industry sources. The data and analysis below has been reviewed by
several economists and industry members. While we attempted to eliminate mistakes and
omissions, there may be some remaining which were unable to be corrected in the short
time frame available for the study.
Viewpoirits regarding concerns and potential implications were solicited from Cargill,
Continental Grain, and other industry and government sources. Sources of data are
camouflaged where necessary to preserve confidentiality. Throughout, we offer the pros
and cons to consider on the issues raised by farmers, industry members, and government
policy makers and regulators, hopefully in a non-judgmental way, to stimulate an
informed dialog.
Antitrust review procedures
A major combination of two leading competitors in the U.S. and world grain
merchandising industry certainlywill prompt market power concerns by policymakers,
the Secretary of Agricultare, etc., which will involve data submission to the relevant
antitrust agencies. The review (and subsequent challenge or approval) will be done by
the U.S. Department of Justice and similar agencies in other parts of the world where
both companies extensively do business.
U.S. antitrust law bars transactions that are likely to have substantial anticompetitive
effects (Azcuenaga). The unifying theme of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) merger guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to
create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise, [the full text of FTC/DOJ
merger guidelines is available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm] Market
power to a seller is the ability to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant
period of time. The relevant agency (the food industry usually is the Department of
Justice jurisdiction) assesses whether the merger would significantly increase
concentration and result in a concentrated market, properly defined and measured.
Second, the agency assesses whether the merger, in light of market concentration and
other factors that characterize the market, raises concern about potential adverse
competitive effects. Third, it analyzes whether entry by new competitors will be timely,
likely, and sufficient either to deter or to counteract the likely short-term anti-competitive
effects. Fourth, it assesses any efficiency gains that cannot reasonably be achieved by the
parties through other means.
Typically, the focus of agency review in the U.S. will be determining: (1) the relevant
market for analysis; (2) the share of the market controlled by the companies involved; (3)
the measures of market concentration before and after the acquisition (small changes are
usually considered more important in more highly concentrated markets; large changes
are relatively less important in unconcentrated markets), and (4) the ease and speed of
entry by potential competitors. In some cases, control of key technologies (e.g.
Monsanto's genetic engineering patents in their recent DEKALB Genetics acquisition) or
raw materials, or possible competitive bottlenecks or foreclosure of access to markets at
important stages in a distribution chain may suggest potential market power. Such
conditions may warrant further analysis.
At the same time, tradeoffs to possible reductions in market competition are also
considered. The Agency considers whether efficiencies likely would be sufficient to
reverse the merger's potential, to harm consumers or suppliers in the relevant market, e.g.,
by preventing price increases to customers orprice reductions to suppliers in that market.
The Merger Guidelines indicate that merging firms must substantiate efficiency claims so
that the Agency can verify by reasonable means: (1) the likelihood and magnitude ofeach
asserted efficiency; (2) how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing
so); (3) how each would enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete; and
(4) why each would be merger-specific. Efficiency claims will not be considered if they
are vagueor speculativeor otherwise cannotbe verifiedby reasonable means.
Two key points are raised in theGuidelines regarding efficiencies as anoffset to concerns
regarding loss of competition—(a) efficiencies are most likely to make a difference in
merger analysis when the likely adverse competitive effects, absent the efficiencies, are
not great; and (b) efficiencies almost neverjustify a merger to form a monopoly or near-
monopoly.
The industry and market setting
To put the proposed acquisition in perspective, we first review the changing structure of
theworldandU.S. markets in which these grain merchandisers operate."
The food and agricultural sector has been undergoing rapid consolidation in the last two
decades, as this sector joined with many others in the U.S. economy in the merger and
acquisition wave. The farm production transition toward fewer, larger, more
sophisticated operations was joined by similar consolidation of volumes in the hands of
fewer, larger firms in the farm input, food processing, food wholesaling, food service and
food retailing industries. The international scope of the market for food and agricultural
products expanded dramatically, and the demands of the domestic and international
customers changed the nature of competition and the strategies necessary to succeed in
these inter-related industries. Developments in information technology and, more
recently, biotechnology have begun to play major roles in the organization of the food
sector.
U.S. grain exports have been cyclical, and,often volatile from year to year (See Figure 1).
In the late 1960s and 70s, the world grain market grew rapidly as incomes improved
globally, and markets which previously had been closed (especially the former Soviet
Union) became major customers for grain. This often involved single government buyers
of basic commodities in very large bulk transactions. U.S. grain production and exports
grew rapidly, as did the corresponding infrastructure to provide the necessary storage,
rail, barge, and ocean freight distribution system. (See Figure 1). In the 1980s and 1990s,
the export market tumbled as the economies of, first, the former Soviet Union, and later
the increasingly important Asian customers (Japan, Thailand, Korea, etc.) had significant
problems which led to a sharp reduction in overall grain and oilseed exports. Argentina
and Brazil became major competitors in com and soybean export markets, and Western
Europe became a net exporter in the late 1980s, reducing the U.S. share of world exports.
At the same time, the growth of the U.S. poultry and livestock feeding sector and the
domestic grain and oilseed processing industries (com sweeteners, ethanol, soy crushing)
led to greater domestic use of grain and soybeans, and a reduced role for exports in the
U.S. marketing system. Expanded pork and beef exports displaced grain exports. Grain
and oilseed export-related facilities for storage, handling, transporting, and ship-loading
were built as a result of government program incentives or contemplation of continued
export growth, resulting in substantial excess capacity (grain storage capacity peaked in
the late 1980s). While excess capacity is difficult to measure with precision, comparing
peak export volumes in recent years, months orquarters with recent export volumes (see
Table 1) shows a few measures of surplus capacity in theU.S. grain export system, and
why recent profitability suffered for the major grain merchandisers most dependent on
exports. Note that the export areas inTable 1may not be defined the same as the tables
which follow (e.g. Pacific includes Califomia as well as Pacific Northwest ports; Interior
are basically Mexican and Canadian border terminal sources, primarily rail). Note also
that with the extreme volatility of U.S. grain exports in relatively short periods of time,
that substantial excess capacity is needed to accommodate unanticipated surges in
demand. In two out of the last seven years, these export surges caused volume changes of
55% from the high to the low export volumes. Moreover, grain export demand is
seasonal so that annual export volumes may under-state peak capacity needs during the
fall harvest season.
Trying to describe effectively the many stages of the grain and oilseed marketing system
is very difficult. Grain sold by a fariner to a local elevator and ultimately destined for
export may have several changes of ownership, with prices established several times at
different locations, at rail terminals, river terminals, and export terminals, (See Figure 2).
Grain may be diverted from that distribution stream by competitive bidding from
livestockproducers, feed companies, com or soybean processors along the way. A fairly
large number of competing merchandisers may own relatively few facilities like country
grain elevators, barge or ship loading facilities, but still be active competitors (paper
traders) buying and selling grain at each stage of the merchandising system, and using
facilities owned by others (acquired on a competitive bid basis) for storing, blending,
loading and unloading. With excess capacity in the storage and distribution system in
recent years, their operating costs are often quite low, and "paper traders" have been
effective competitors. Their effectiveness, however, is heavily dependent on excess
capacity in the marketing system, and with concentrated ownership of facilities, they
would be much less effective if exports were to increase sharply and strain the capacity of
the system at a future time.
The players in the grain merchandising system have changed greatly over the last 20
years. Table 2 below summarizes estimated storage capacity by Milling and Baking News
in 1981 and 1998. Milling and processing storage capacities are included, so these are
not purely grain merchandising facilities. The Cargill figures do not include "The
Andersons" storage capacity; they have recently begun a marketing venture with "The
Andersons" at Toledo and Maumee, Ohio, but do not own the facilities'". Cargill reports
that their grain merchandising storage capacity (excluding.processing. The Andersons,
etc.) is 345 million bushels, and their other processing, subsidiary and joint venture
storage capacity (excluding The Andersons) brings their total storage capacity to 463
million bushels.
Table 2. Storage capacity of 10 Largest U.S. Grain Elevator, Milling and Processing
Company Total Capacity,
1981(mil.bu.)
Company Total capacity, 1999
(mil. bu.)
Cargill
Far-Mar-Co
148
122
ADM
Cargill
611
463'
Continental Grain no ConAgra/Peavey 198
Union Equity Co-op 67 Farmland Grain
Div.
178
Pillsbury
Central Soya
54
51
Bunge
Continental Grain
170
169
Bunge 47 Cenex Harvest 146
The Andersons 43
States Coop.
Riceland Foods 102
Lincoln Grain 39 The Andersons 80
Indian Grain 39 General Mills 72
Sources: Structural Change and Performance of the U.S. Grain Marketing Industry;
Milling and Baking News Grain and Milling Annual, 1999, pp. 21-22; 'Cargill (M&BN
has 515).
Only three of the largest grain companies in 1981 show up on the 1998 list. Three farmer
cooperatives are now part of the top 10, versus two in 1981. Some regional cooperatives
have grain merchandising joint ventures with other corporations ~ e.g. Cargill, ADM.
Price discovery takes place at each stage of the system where ownership changes hands,
with the interaction of supply and demand forces in each local or regional area, in turn
influenced by supply and demand conditions at locations closer to the ultimate customer
for the basic commodities— the domestic or export customer. Price reporting by
government agencies plus the interactions of buyers and sellers provide a good deal of
transparency in the price discovery process among the merchandisers, and—through
government price reporting and bids to local elevators-ultimately to farmers.
I
The Chicago and Kansas City Boards of Trade and the Minneapolis Grain Exchange play
a significant role in providing com, wheat and soybean futures contracts which are used
to manage price risks for farmers and grain merchandisers at all stages of the system. All
three futures markets have delivery points for each contract which involve some Cargill
and Continental elevators. The futures markets are a major source of market information
as well as global price-discovery mechanisms, and exert significant influenceon the price
and margin structure in the grain industry.
Cargill and Continental Grain
Cargill, Inc. is the largest private company in the Forbes magazine 1998 listing of private
companies in the U.S., and Continental GrainCompany was no. 5 on the list (Table3).
Cargill Continental
Revenue (billion $) 51.4 15
Net profits (million $) 468 100 (est.)
Employees (thousands) 80.6 17.5
Source: Forbes magazine
These data are for the entire companies, which include very large livestock production,
feed company and financial operations for Continental Grain, and extensive livestock
production and meat processing, feed, poultry, steel, shipping and other business
enterprises for Cargill. Cargill has grain merchandising offices and facilities in 43
couritries. In the U.S., Cargill has 243 grain facilities; the industry leader, ADM, through
ownership or joint ventures has 669 facilities, according to Milling and Baking News.
Note that estimated average profit per dollar of sales was less than one percent for
Cargill's combined businesses, and even less for Continental Grain, though these are only
for one year, and may not be representative. For its 1995-96 and 1996-97 fiscal years,
Cargill reported gross revenues of $56 million (Billion?) each year and profits of $804
and $902 million, respectively. Its profits in these two years were less than two percent
of sales.
Only the Continental grain storage, transportation, export and trading operations, with
offices and facilities in 30 countries (in North and South America, Europe, the Middle
east, Africa and Asia) are involved in the acquisition, with customers in over 100
countries. If approved by the DOJ, the assets and selected employees will be transferred
in first quarter, 1999. In the U.S., Cargill indicates that these assets include 83 grain
handling facilities, which will add 73 new locations to their current 243, and 10 facilities
where Continental and Cargill elevators currently coexist close to each other.
Cargill and Continental are important in other parts of the world grain economy as well.
For example, a Cargill Argentina press release indicates the combined operations would
account for about 25 percent of Argentine com wheat and soybean exports. They are
significant competitors in most areas of grain production, along with such trading
companies and merchandisers such as Peavey, ADM, Bunge, Zen Noh, Cenex Harvest
States, Tradigrain, Farmland, AGP, Nidera, Mitsui, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Kanematsu,
Glencore, Oriac, Itochu, CAM, A.C. Toepfer, and Seaboard.
Reasons for the acquisition
Why did Continental Grain sell?
Industry speculation is that Continental excelled in very large volumebulk export trading,
and had not diversified enough into the value addedprocessing to compete effectively in
a market environment where export volumes have been sharply reduced in recent years.
To compete effectively by restructuring their operations at this late date would require too
much capital and too much risk. Continental's storage capacity declined significantly over
the last 10 years, while Cargill, ADM and Peavey expanded (Top Producer, Jan., 1999).
Their capital could be more productively employed in their other agricultural and
financial businesses.
Why did Cargill buy Continental?
Cargill expects this acquisition to contribute to its ability to compete effectively in a
rapidly changing market environment. The acquisition will contribute to more effective
knowledge acquisition and transfer from an expanded global presence and a broader base
of grain origination facilities in the countries where grain is produced. The grain
merchandising system is a high fixed cost system. Cargill hopes to compete more
effectively and keep a large share of the Continental volume, capturing economies of
scale by running more volume through without equivalent changes in the costs of
managing their system. Further, Cargill expects that it will be more able to take costs out
of the system, not just through fewer people, but by dedicating some facilities to
specialized products and getting more efficiencies in operations (shorter barge turnaround
times, longer runs in elevator handling, etc.). Their new joint venture with Monsanto to
arrange production and to market value-added specialty grains and oilseeds for the feed
and processing industries will require greater capacity to handle segregated grain flows
throughout the domestic and export marketing system. Continental has had a significant
presence in the identity preserved grain market, with half its international feed customers
converted to high oil com. Cargill expects to better serve the producer by enhancing
productivity and passing some of those cost savings on in the form of better prices to their
suppliers and customers. They also plan offer many more price risk management
alternatives and advice, financing, etc., to farmers.
The efficiencies which Cargill plans to achieve from the acquisition will have to be
estimated in tangible terms for consideration by the Department of Justice. In addition,
some of the less tangible benefits identified by Cargill could influence the firm's
effectiveness in competing in the domestic and world market arenas. A broader coverage
of the major world suppliers and customers in the world grain and oilseed trade may offer
improved market intelligence, a key to effective trading in a very risky environment, as
well as more effective and timely sourcing to serve a broader array of discriminating
customers.
Concerns regarding the acquisition
The basic concern expressed by some farmers, politicians, and industry participants is that
Cargill bought Continental to remove a significant competitor, particularly in the export
market, and expand merchandising margins. The ability to "control" more facilities and
larger volumes of grain and soybeans might adversely influence competition and the
transparency ^d effectiveness of the price discovery process in the grain marketing
system.
Other issues which might arise are similar to those being raised in the current Microsoft
case, such as: Will the merger result other merchandisers and processors having to
conform to Cargill standards in grain merchandising?; Will the merger result in
exclusivity in marketing arrangements with Cargill such that firms that do business with
Cargill are excluded from or penalized for doing business with other merchandisers?
Will Cargill bundle products or terms into their merchandising arrangements, like
requiring its buyers and suppliers to use Cargill transportation orCargill risk management
tools? Will Cargill control so much grain at various stages of the system that fewer
negotiated prices and price reports are available to keep the price discovery system
transparent?
This paper will deal with only a few of the most important issues, but hopefully will lay
the groundwork for subsequent study of other issues.
Some relevant facts
How much will the acquisition change the number and size of competitors in the U.S.
grain marketing system? We examine the Cargill and Continental grain elevator storage
capacity, barge and ship loading capability, and volumes handled at each stage of the
system by Cargill, Continental, and their major competitors. Further, we consider other
factors influencing whether the acquisition of Continental might change the competitive
landscape significantly. The overall influence of Cargill and Continental and their
overlaps in the U.S. can be seen in the U.S. map (Figure 2) summarizing all country, river
and ship loading elevator locations in the U.S. developed from the April, 1998 USDA
Farm Services Agency data base on off- farm grain storage capacity. The second map
(Figure 3) shows the locations of the key barge and ship loading areas which we subjected
to further study, due to their potential to be a competitive bottleneck if there were very
high levels of concentration at these locations.
Cargill indicates that the combined grain merchandising businesses accounted for 3
percent of the 10,500 U.S. commercial grain storage facilities (6-7 percent of commercial
storage space), 20 percent of river terminal elevator capacity, 35 percent of U.S. grain and
oilseed exports, and 10-13 percent of grain coming off farms (8-10 percent-Cargill, 1-2
percent—Continental Grain).
The relevant market
The U.S. grain markets are generally perceived as a fairly well integrated national market.
Farmer cooperatives originate a large share of grain from farmers. Both cooperatives
(Such as Farmland, Harvest States, Land O* Lakes), public and private grain trading or
processing companies (like Cargill, Continental, ADM, Farmland, ConAgra, General
Mills, Louis Dreyfus, Zen Noh, etc.) play roles in direct purchases from farmers and
subsequent trading of commodities at many stages of the distribution process, arbitraging
any small differences in prices in acquiring and shipping grain to make small percentage
trading profits.
In an old (1979) study of the U.S. com market, Thompson andDahl found that the veiy
high correlation of com price changes in five locations around the country (correlation
with what?, prices in each market moving simultaneously in direction and size of
changes?) suggested that thepricing behavior was like that found in perfectly competitive
markets. A more recent (1997) study by Good, et al., shows high soybean price
correlations between the Gulf and most midwest locations (over .85 for daily price
changes), and correlations for com for similar locations between .5 and .85. This is one
indication that various areas within the U.S. are all part of a national market (but does not
necessarily indicate perfect competitiveness. One would expect that same high
correlation, even if Cargill were a monopolist at the Gulf.)
The export locations
Cargill estimates that Cargill and Continental Grain accounted for 35 percent of U.S.
grain and oilseed exports last year. Industry sources using Department of Commerce (Pier
Import Export Reporting Service) data for a shorter time period, May, 1997 - October,
1998, calculate that Cargill and Continental Grain accounted for 14.5 and 13.1 percent,
respectively, of export shipments of wheat, com, soybeans, sorghum, barley and oats,
based on bills of lading filed with U.S. Customs.'" Secretary of Agriculture Dan
Glickman, in a letter to the Department of Justice, estimated that the combined Cargill-
Continental Grain operations accounted for 42 percent of com export volume, 31 percent
.of soybeans, and 19 percent of wheat exports in fiscal 1998, based on grain inspected by
USDA for export from their facilities last year.
GIPSA-USDA provided data oh the shares of export volume in fiscal 1998 by the leading
firms, and the share accounted for by the leading four firms in each location (summarized
in Table 4). This data treats Cargill and Continental Grain .as separate firms, so their
combination would increase these shares by the top four firms. There is a very large share
of the volume accounted for by a few firms in a large number of locations. Nationally, 81
percent of com exports were accounted for from the facilities of the top four firms, which
include Cargill, Continental, ADM and Zen Noh. Note that this does not necessarily
mean that the grain was owned by those firms; they may have just provided the ship
loading facilities for a fee for another competitor in the market. In a time of major excess
industry capacity such as at present, even with concentrated ownership of facilities, such
fees could be less than full costs of providing the service. In times of a shortage of
capacity, the fees could exceed full costs of providing the service. The same top four
firms accounted for 65 percent of soybean exports, while a substantially different set of
largest firms provided a much lower share (47 percent) of wheat exports.
The most concentrated export locations include the small-volume Atlantic Coast port
locations, the moderate volume Pacific Northwest port locations, and the very large
volume Gulf port locations. Examining the firms involved at each location, and the
changes in storage, loading capacity and market shares from the acquisition may provide
some useful insights into possible competitive implications.
Tables 5- 13 summarize the GIPSA-USDA ship loading facility data for fiscal 1998.
Note that a firm^s share of storage capacity or loading capacity is likely to be highly
correlated with share of volume handled, but either clearly is not a perfect index of
volume market shares.
An examination of the USDA ship loading capacity and storage in the leading port areas
discloses that theCargill acquisition will have little or no impact inDuluth and Toledo on
theGreatLakes, but will remove the only grain elevator competitor remaining in Chicago
(which has been declining in importance in the grain industry for a long time; Cargill
closed a facility there a few years ago). While Chicago might be viewed as a dying
market, with Chicago and Toledo dominated by either Cargill facilities or facilities
operated under a joint venture including Cargill, this still may raise questions regarding
the CBOT futures contracts where these are the only effective delivery points for 1999
(St. Louisseldom offers warehouse receipts forCBOT deliveries).^
On the low-volume East Coast, Cargill is the primary exporter in the Virginia ports,
unchanged due to the acquisition. In the Pacific Northwest, Cargill's share of capacity
will be near 50 percent, up slightly with the addition of one Continental elevator, with
several other competitors.
In the Louisiana and Texas Gulf, Continental only had a small share of capacity (9 and 12
percent, respectively) in each location. Combined with Cargill's 22 percent share in the
Texas Gulf and near 30 percent in the larger-volume LouisianaGulf ports, this may not
be viewed as a significant change from the acquisition, since there are several competitive
private and public (e.g. Port ofHouston, Portof Corpus Christi) ship loading terminals. In
the combined Louisiana and Texas Gulf port area, Cargill accounts for 36 percent of ship
loading storage capacity after the acquisition, versus 26 percent before. While the
advantages of low cost barge transportation may make the Louisiana Gulf ports more
attractive destinations for export grain from many parts of the upper Midwest than the
Texas gulf, the Gulf ports also are competitive with each other and probably with East
Coast and Great Lakes ports for export business in many countries. The Gulf ports often
will also be competing.directly or indirectly for some parts of the west central U.S. grain
with exporters using the PNW ports to serve Asian markets as well. Thus, the shares by
leading firms in a local or regional area may not be a good indicator of their potential
impact on competition and prices in those areas.
Since the export market concentration is substantially higher than at other stages in the
grain marketing system, this is one of the relevant market issues which will have to be
carefully examined by the antitrust authorities. Are any or all of these ports really
separate and distinct markets? If so, is the change in export market concentration (shares
of market volume, not capacity) attributable to the acquisition likely to significantly
reduce competition?
River barge terminal locations
We have examined USDA data on storage capacity and barge loading capability for
facilities located on the Illinois (both the upper part North of Pekin and entire river),
Ohio, Upper Mississippi, and Missouri (near Kansas City) Rivers. These are the barge
feeder systems into the Mississippi River for export out of the Gulf. Approved facilities
in the Kansas locations serve as the delivery points for the Kansas City Board of trade
wheat contract, and the Northern Illinois River is slated to be the com futures delivery
area for the ChicagoBoard of Trade in 2000, while the entire Illinois River (down to St.
Louis) will serve as the delivery points for the CBOT soybean futures contracts. The
USDA data are summarized in Tables 14-19. Be cautious in interpreting the barge
loading capacity, as it appears that some facilities with shared capacity are listed multiple
times in the USDA data.
We note little change from the Cargill acquisition on the Missouri River, and the Ohio
River. We also examined the Columbia River, Arkansas River and Tennessee River (no
tables included), and found little or no change from the acquisition. Consequently, we
will not consider them further.
On the Upper Mississippi, where there are a large number of competing firms, Cargill's
addition of Continental modestly increases its share of storage capacity to near 27
percent, from 20 percent previously.
On the Illinois River, the shares by company vary depending upon whether all the river
(for the CBOT soybean contract) or the Northern part of the river (for the CBOT com
contract) are considered, and whether the very large Chicago Continental facility and the
Cargill Bums Harbor facility are included as river barge loading locations. The Chicago
facilities are higher cost operations; thus they rarely load barges.
We will discuss the shares of capacity excluding the Chicago area facilities, then footnote
differences when they are included. ADM is clearly the largest firm, with approximately
33 percent of the storage space on the entire river, but ADM's share is 60 percent in the
area above Pekin which will be the delivery area for the com futures contract. Cargill's
acquisition will bring its share of capacity from 18 percent to 25 percent for the entire
river, and increase its share of the Northern Illinois storage from 11 percent to 27
percent.^* Consolidated Grain andBarge is a large competitor in the lower Illinois River
(28 percent of entire river storage), but only has one f^ility above Pekin. Cargill's
acquisition might not appear problematic in this area if ADM was not so large. However,
the combination of these two large players and their share of volume traded, not just
storage capacity, in the futures market delivery area may prompt closer examination by
the DOJ.
Several issues might warrant examination. First, is it appropriate to simply consider the
barge loading firms as the competitors to examine, as a conduit to the export market as
the special focus. Or must other firms buying grain for feed and processing from the same
origination areas also be considered? If so, how many andhow important are each in the
local or regional market? This question is one weare unable to address in our briefstudy.
If the concern is about (1) whether competitive margins at an important export market
conduit are likely to be effectively increased, or (2) whether the firms in the Northern
Ulinois area approved for delivery by the CBOT may be able to artificially influence
deliveries, handling costs, and therefore futures prices, basis, and price spreads, then a
narrowerdrawing of the relevant market may be warranted. Otherwise, the competition
from non-river locations will be an important factor diluting the estimated degree of
concentration, perhaps dramatically.
Potential competition in the form of (1) excesscapacity of currentbarge loading facilities,
or (2) the speed and cost of addingnew barge loading and/or storage capacitywould also
warrant study, to determine whether any potential market power of a few large firms
could be quickly and easily defused by entry into these local or regional markets.
Chicago, Toledo and the Illinois River
It might be argued that the consolidation in Chicago is merely a symptom of a dying
market which has outlived its usefulness. One industry source contends that Chicago
elevators are not a factor in the export trade as they are no longer in the main flow of
grain; thus he was not concerned who owns or controls them as they do hot drive the
market anymore.
Excess capacity present in Chicago and Toledo may be forcing consolidation. Further,
broader competition for com, wheat and soybeans is present than is represented by the
few ship or barge loading facilities in Chicago, Toledo and St. Louis which happen to be
approved for CBOT deliveries. Perhaps this is no problem from a competition
standpoint, but only a perceived problem because of the narrow definitions of delivery
points by the CBOT (the expressed purpose for the narrower delivery ^ea was to reduce
basis variability). If so, that may be a problem to be solved by the CBOT, not the DOJ.
The CBOT has made changes in contract delivery specifications effective beginning in
the year 2000 by replacing deliveries via warehouse receipts in Chicago, Toledo and St.
Louis with barge shipping certificates at approved locations on the Northern Illinois River
(com) and Illinois River to St. Louis (soybeans). Proposals for changes in the CBOT
wheat contract are pending. These changes are clear improvements to the contracts, by
increasing the size of the delivery area and the number of facilities approved for delivery.
One industry source characterizes the new delivery locations and specifications using
shipping certificates as a very liquid market with very few barriers to entry. However, the
near 85 percent share of storage capacity by two firms (and probably a higher share of
volume) in the Northern Illinois River prompts a more thorough look at the situation
there. Expanding the delivery areas to the entire Illinois River, adding the upper
Mississippi as an option when it wasn't frozen, or similar changes to reduce concentration
of ownership of barge loading facilities (or barges themselves, not considered here) may
warrant consideration.
Potential competition
The grain coming to the Illinois River probably comes primarily from areas close to the
Illinois or from points farther East, as the Mississippi is close to it on the West, and
would intercept any grain from the West except when the Mississippi is closed to barge
traffic in the winter. Thus, any artificial margin enhancement in the short run by the
largest firms on the Illinois likely could be circumvented by, for example: going to
uncooperative fringe competitors on the Illinois which currently have a lot of excess
capacity (adding shifts or hours of operation); bypassing the Illinois to go to the
Mississippi at a small marginal freight cost from areas East of the Mississippi (except in
the winter); moving grain by truck or rail to lower Illinois River competitors, or using
more expensive rail shipment to the Gulf —if other local processors, feed users, etc., did
not provide effective competition. Such actions may be sufficient to keep the market well
arbitraged and result in little or no margin enhancement. -At least one non-Cargill
industry source contends the river market "is too "fluid" to allow squeezes to occur. It
doesn't take much competition or delivery threat to make markets adjust to reality."
In the intermediate run, barge handling capacity could be added by adding truck-barge or
rail-barge loading facilities at relatively low cost, or adding more expensive storage
facilities with barge loading facilities at new locations. Industry sources suggest that a
new truck-barge loader, with minimal storage capacity, could be up and running in about
four months at an estimated cost of about $2-3 million, although required environmental
assessments and permits might lengthen the period. A larger, more sophisticated facility
with more extensive storage, two truck dumps and a drying system could be built in about
eight months at a cost of about $5 million. Thus, entry of new competitors does not
appear difficult if an adequate location can be found and environmental requirements
accomodated. CBOT requirements of $5 million net worth also don't appear too
restrictive for new entrants to qualify as delivery locations. With excess capacity now,
and no clear signals that the export demand for grain will surge in the next year or two,
there is no incentive for such expansion. If excess capacity remains, it would be difficult
to exploit the high concentration on the Northern Illinois River, so new entrants may not
be necessary to police the large companies for a long time.
Grain origination off-farms
Table 20 summarizes the GIPSA-USDA data on off-farm storage capacities in the U.S.
by company (Mapped in Figure 2, with Cargill and Continental Grain facilities noted).
Ownership is not highly concentrated, with a large farmer cooperative influence. The
acquisition will expand Cargill's geographic coverage in country locations as well as the
river and port locations discussed above. Cargill reports that the two companies
accounted for 10-13 percent of grain coming off farms last year (8-10 percent-Cargill, 1-
2 percent—Continental Grain). This was from 3 percent of the 10,500 U.S. commercial
grain storage facilities (with 6-7 percent of commercial storage space).
Summary and Overview
This quick study of the readily available data pertinent to evaluation of the Cargill
acquisition of Continental Grain's grain merchandising business in theU.S. market offers
the following insights:
• Concerns regarding loss of competition are prompted by the Cargill's acquisition
of its largest competitor in the exporting of grain. Together, they account for
roughly 35 percent of com, soybean and wheat volume, with a higher com export
market share.
• The grain and oilseed markets are national in scope, for U.S. antitrust analysis,
and international in scope as well.
• Most port locations are relatively concentrated with a relatively small number of
owners, though the largest-volume locations like the Gulf have a large number of
competitors. The "dying" Chicago grain elevator business declined from two
competitors to one due to the acquisition. This could be a temporary problem due
to its still being a CBOT delivery point in 1999, and another delivery point -
Toledo -- is dominated by a Cargill/The Andersons joint venture. This still may
be a problem for the CBOT wheat contract in 2000.
• Most river terminal locations were affected very little by the Cargill acquisition.
The Northern Illinois River, the new CBOT delivery location for com, now will
have two firms accounting for over 85 percent of the barge loading elevator
storage capacity after the acquisition. Excess capacity by smaller elevator
competitors, other processor, feed company, etc., competitors in the market, and
ease of entry might ease concerns about excess market power in this regional
market. The CBOT may need to expand its com and wheat delivery areas to
avoid perception of risk of manipulation by largest companies there.
• There are numerous competitors buying grain from farmers in most areas; the
acquisition probably will make little difference in local competition for farmers'
grain.
• The better utilization of excess capacity and likely cost reductions in the grain
merchandising system are the primary efficiency gains which will have to be
documented by Cargill in the antitrust review as offsets to any concerns regarding
potential loss of competition.
Will potential efficiency gains and improved ability to serve the changing demands of
farmers and customers make Cargill and the U.S. grain merchandising industry more
effective competitors in the rapidly changing world market? Or will the further
consolidation of the industry into fewer hands in important export and river terminal
markets reduce competitiveness significantly in this very important marketing system?
Some economists (Good, et al.) have argued that there are many competing uses and
markets for grain in the U.S. and overseas to keep markets sufficiently arbitraged.
The dynamic changes in the world seed and grain production and marketing system which
have been occurring and appear on the horizon (related to biotechnology) are likely to
transform the system from the "commodity" orientation to a specialty (value-added trait)
product system over the next decade ortwo. Is this acquisition likely to play a useful role
in positioning this company and the U.S. industry as a more efficient and effective
competitor for U.S. farmers' grain, and for customers in the U.S. and world markets? Or
does it have some associated shortcomings for industry competitiveness in the short run
which need to be remedied before the acquisition is approved by our Department of
Justice? Hopefully the data and analysis provided here will contribute to an informed
dialog and debate.
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Cargill leases their Toledo-Maumee facilities to The Andersons and have a marketing
agreement with them for grain originated in the Toledo-Maumee area only. The
agreement does not cover grain originated or marketed by The Andersons outside of the
four Toledo-Maumee facilities. Toledo-Maumee represents only a portion of The
Andersons' grain origination and marketing business.
Other leading exporters of those grains included Zen Noh, Louis Dreyfus, Mitsui,
Alfred Toepfer, ADM, Agrex, Gamac, Marubeni America, Tradigrain,, Farmland,
Harvest States, Bunge, Columbia Grain, and Peavey, and Alliance, each with more than
one percent of total exports. Over 100 additional companies were listed as exporters of
smaller volumes in that 1997-98 period.
^Perhaps the CBOT may need to shift their contract to the new delivery points in 1999,or
negotiate a contract with Cargill and the Andersons which provides adequate safeguards
on space availability, etc., for anyone making or taking delivery under CBOT futures
contracts in Chicago and Toledo during the next year.
^'If Continental Chicago and Cargill Bums Harbor facilities were included, the Cargill
Upper Illinois share would be 66 percent, ADM would be 28 percent. For the entire
Illinois River, the Cargill share would increase to 46 percent, ADM would be 22 percent,
while Consolidated Grain and Barge would be 20 percent.
Table 1, Several Measures ofExcess CapacityofU.S. Grain Export Facilities
Annual
Capacity
of Exporting
Facilities*
Annual
Capacity
Based on
Record
Month
Annual
Capacity
Based on
Record
Quarter
(mln Bushels)
Maximum
Exports
Since
1990
Minimum
Exports
Since
1990
Lakes 2,673 638 583 274 123
Atlantic 1,048 876 671 164 51
East Gulf 4,130 3,168 2,675 2,527 1,832
Texas Gulf 1,576 1,416 1,072 499 336
Pacific 3,962 1,544 1,277 1,146 702
Interior 360 365 256 239 109
Total 13,749 8,007 6,534 4,654 3,325
* Facility Capacity assumes each facility operates with 3 shift/ day, 6 days/week, 52 weeks/year.
** Export data source ~ Cargill data base which includes combination of Inspections & Census.
Source: Cargill
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Table 4. Export market shares by top four firms
Total Port
Volume
. Top 4
Share Top 4 Companies
Volume T% *
Precent
National Exports [All Ports]
Com 35,862,622 29,022,788 80.9
Wheat 25,922,437 12,068,195 46.6
Soybeans 22,402,723 14,531,886 64.9
Mississippi River [New Orleans ]
Com 28,382,994 25,549,852 90.0
Wheat 5,784,891 3,976,726 68.7
Soybeans 17,606,377 13,320,898 75.7
Texas Gulf
Com 427,421 346,315 81.0
Wheat 7,222,742 6,221,799 86.1
Soybeans 919,568 919,568 100.0
Atlantic Coast
Com 76,432 76,432 100.0
Wheat 485,621 485,621 100.0
Soybeans 626,638 626,638 100.0
ADM, Cargill, Continental, ZenNoh
Cargill, Columbia Grain, Peavey, United
Grain
ADM, Cargill, Continental, ZenNoh
ADM, Cargill, Continental, ZenNoh
ADM, Cargill, Continental, Peavey
ADM, Bunge, Cargill, ZenNoh
JacintoPort
Public
Cargill, OA Port Authority
Cargill, GA Port Authority
ADM, GA Port Authority
Great Lakes
Com
Wheat
Soybeans
PNW
Com
Wheat
Soybeans
1,398,552 1,147,592 82.1
1,891,249
1,904,852
5,577,223
10,537,933
1,345,287
1,744,010
1,349,830
5,577,223
8,680,651
1,345,287
92.2
70.9
100.0
82.4
100.0
Andersons, Cargill, Continental, Harvest
States
AGP, Cargill, Harvest States, Peavey
AGP, Andersons, Harvest States, Peavey
Cargill, Continental, Peavey
Cargill, Columbia Grain, Louis Dreyfus,
United Grain
Cargill, Continental, Peavey
Source: UnitedStates Department ofAgriculture; Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration
Table 5, Largest Ship Loadouts
Name
Cargill Incoiporated
Other
Cenex Harvest States
Coop
Continental Grain
Company
Archer Daniels
Midland
General Mills
Corporation
Conagra Incorporated
Bunge Corporation
Louis Dreyfus
Total
Daily Ship
Loadout
(bushels)
6,924,000
4,206,666
655,000
%oj
Total
33.44
20.32
Storage
(bushels)
93,449,000
36,704,000
%oS
Total
35.50
13.95
3.16 31,518,000 11.97
2,690,000 12.99 31,061,000 11.80
3,160,000 15.26 28,232,000 10.73
640,000
1,380,000
800,000
250,000
20,705,666
3.09 17,369,000
6.66
3.86
1.21
16,451,000
6,523,000
1,895,000
263,202,000
6.60
6.25
2.48
0.72
Table 6. Skip Loadout Atlantic
Total Capacityt bushels:
CarglU Capacity, bushels:
Cargill Share:
Name
Archer Daniels
Midland
ADM/COUNTRY
MARK LLC
Ship Loadout Capacity
perDay (shared) ^ ST
Storage,
Bushels
Cargill
Incorporated
320,000.00BU
INCORPORATED 800,OOO.OOBU
CARGILL,
INCORPORTED
800.000.00BU
BALTIMORE MD
Sum:
3,663,000
3,663,000
CHESAPEAKE VA 6,945,000
NORFOLK VA 3,539,000
Sum: 10,484,000
14,147,000
10,484,000
74.11
% of Total
25.89
74.11
Table 7, Ship Loadout Chicago
Name
Cargill
Incorporated
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
Continental Grain
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
Ship Loadout Capacity
perDay (shared)
480,000.00BU
200,000.00BU
240,OOO.OOBU
Total Capacity^ bushels: 17,924,000
CargiU Capacity, 17 924 000
bushels:
City
BURNS
HARBOR
Cargill Share:
Storage,
Bushels
IN
Sum:
CHICAGO IL
5,473,000
5,473,000
9,188,000
MILWAUKEE WI 3,263,000
Sum: 12,451,000
100.00
%of
Total
30.53
69.47
Table 8, Ship Loadout Duluth
Name
Cargill Incorporated
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
Cenex Harvest States
CENEX HARVEST STATES
Conagra Incorporated
CONCOURSE GRAIN LLC
General Mills
GENERAL MILLS
OPERATIONS,
Ship Loadout Capacity
per Day'(shared)
800.000.00BU
250.000.00BU
420.000.00BU
320,OOO.OOBU
Total Capacity, bushelis: 52^82,000
Cargill Capacity, bushels: 12,164,000
Cargill Share: 23.13
City ST
DULUTH MN
Sum:
SUPERIOR WI
Sum:
SUPERIOR WI
Sum:
SUPERIOR
Sum:
Storage, %ofTotal
Bushels •'
12.164,000
12,164,0 23.13
18,562,000
18,562,000 35.30
8,283,000
8,283,000 15.75
WI 13,573,000
13,573,000 25.81
Table 9. Ship Loadout GulfCoast
Name
Archer Daniels
Midland
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
Bunge Corporation
BUNGE
CORPORATION
Cargill Incorporated
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
Cenex Harvest States
CENEX HARVEST
STATES
Conagra Incorporated
CONCOURSE GRAIN LLC
CONCOURSE GRAIN LLC
Ship Loadout
Capacity
per Day (shared) City
Total Capacity, bushels: 84,351,000
Cargill Capacity, bushels: 30,501,000
Cargill Share: 36.16
ST
Storage,
Bushels
%of
Total
6,432,00080,000.00 BU DESTREHAN LA
1,000,000.00 BU AMA LA 5,785,000
Sum: 12,217,000
800,000.00 BU
800,000.00 BU
320,000.00 BU
1,200,000.00 BU
105,000.00 BU
400,000.00 BU
500,000.00 BU
DESTREHAN LA
Sum:
RESERVE LA
BATON ROUGE LA
HOUSTON TX
Sum:
MYRTLE GROVE LA
Sum:
GALVESTON TX
PAULINA LA
Sum:
6,523,000
6,523,000
7,743,000
7,707,000
6,713,000
22,163,000
6,459,000
6,459,000
3,223,000
2,480,000
5,703,000
14.48
7.73
26.27
7.66
6.76
Continental Grain
CONTINENTAL GRAIN
COMPANY
CONTINENTAL GRAIN
COMPANY
Other
INTERSTATE GRAIN
PORT OF HOUSTON
AUTHORITY
PT OF CORPUS CHRISTI
ZEN-NOH GRAIN
CORPORATION
1,400,000.00 BU WESTWEGO LA
400,000.00 BU BEAUMONT TX
Sum:
400,000.00 BU CORPUS CHRISTI TX
500,000.00 BU GALENA PARK TX
640,000.00 BU CORPUS CHRISTI TX
1,500,000.00 BU CONVENT LA
Sum:
4,733,000
3,605,000
8,338,000
6,431,000
6,362,000
5,314,000
4,841,000
22,948,000
9.88
27.21
Table 10. Ship Loadout Louisiana
Ship Loadout Capacity
Name per day (shared)
Archer Daniels Midland
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND 800,000.00 BU
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND 1,000,000.00 BU
Bunge Corporation
BUNGE CORPORATION
Cargill Incorporated
CARGILL INCORPORATED
CARGILL INCORPORATED
Cenex Harvest States
CENEX HARVEST STATES
Conagra Incorporated
CONCOURSE GRAIN LLC
Continental Grain
CONTINTENTAL GRAIN
COMPANY
Other
ZEN-NOH GRAIN
CORPORATION
800,000.00 BU
800,000.00 BU
320,000.00 BU
105,000.00 BU
500,000.00 BU
1,400,000.00 BU
1,500,000.00 BU
Total Capacity, bushels: 52,703,000
CargiUCapacity, bushels:20,183,000
Cargill Share: 38.30
City
DESTREHAN
AMA
ST
Storage,
Bushels % of Total
DESTREHAN
RESERVE
BATON ROUGE
MYRTLE
GROVE
PAULINA
WESTWEGO
CONVENT
LA
LA
6,432,000
5,785,000
Sum: 12,217,000
LA 6,523,000
Sum: 6,523,000
LA
LA
7,743,000
7,707,000
Sum: 15,45,000
LA
Sum: 6,459,000
LA 2,480,000
Sum: 2,480,000
LA 4,733,000
Sum: 4,733,000
LA 4,841,000
Sum: 4,841,000
23.18
12.38
29.32
12.26
4.71
8.98
9.19
Table 11. Ship Loadoiit Texas
Name Ship Loadout
Capacity
per Day (shared)
Cargjll Incorporated
CARGILL INCORPORATED 1,200,000.00 BU
Conagra Incorporated
CONCOURSE GRAIN LLC 400,000.00 BU
Continental Grain
CONTINENTAL GRAIN CO 400,000.00 BU
Other
INTERSTATE GRAIN
PORT OF HOUSTON
AUTHORITY
400,000.00 BU
500,000.00 BU
Total Capacity, bushels: 31,648,000
Cargill Capacity, bushels: 10,318,000
Cargill Share: 32.60
City
HOUSTON
ST
TX
Sum:
Storage,
Bushels
6,713,000
6,713,000
%of
Total
21.21
GALVESTON TX 3,223,000
Sum: 3,223,000 10.18
BEAUMONT TX
Sum:
CORPUS CHRISTI TX
GALENA PARK TX
3,605,000
3,605,000
6,431,000
6,362,000
11.39
PT OF CORPUS CHRISTI 640,000.00 BU CORPUS CHRISTI TX 5,314,000
Sum: 18,107,000 57.21
table 12. Ship Loadout Toledo
Name
Archer Daniels
Midland
ADM/COUNTRY
MARK, LLC
Cargill
Incorporated
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
THE
ANDERSONS. INC.
Conagra
Incorporated
CONAGRA, INC.
Ship Loadout Capacity
per Day (shared) City
Total Capacity, bushels: 26,224,000
Cargill Capacity, bushels: 13,964,000
Cargill Share: 53.25
Storage, % of
ST Bushels Total
400,000.00 BU TOLEDO OH 9,795,000
Sum: 9,795,000 37.35
240,000.00 BU TOLEDO OH 6,732,000
400,000.00 BU TOLEDO OH 7,232,000
Sum: 13,964,000 53.25
60,000.00 BU HURON OH 2,465,000
Sum: 2,465,000 9.40
Table 13, Ship Loadout Pacific
Name
Archer Daniels Midland
KALAMA EXPORT
COMPANY LLC
Cargill Incorporated
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
Cenex Harvest States
CENEX HARVEST
STATES COOP
Continental Grain
CONTGR CO & HAR STS
JV DBA
Louis Dreyfus
LOUIS DREYFUS
CORPORATION
Other
COLUMBIA GRAIN INTL
INC
UNITED GRAIN CORP
OF OREGON
Ship Loadout Capacity
per Day (shared)
640,000.00BU
584,OOO.OOBU
800,000.00BU
300.000.00BU
250,OOO.OOBU
250,000.00BU
466,666.00BU
500,OOO.OOBU
City
Total Capacity, bushels:
Cargill Capacity, bushels:
Cargill Share:
ST Storage, Bushels
2,557,000
2,557,000
9,598,000
4,580,000
14,178,000
KALAMA WA
Sum:
PORTLAND OR
SEATTLE WA
Sum:
KALAMA WA
Sum:
TACOMA WA
i
Sum:
PORTLAND OR
Sum:
PORTLAND OR
VANCOUVERWA
Sum:
6,497,000
6,497,000
3,337,000
3,337,000
1.895,000
1,895,000
4,181,000
5,405,000
9,586,000
38,050,000
17,515,000
46.03
% ofTotal
6.72
37.26
17.07
8.77
4.98
25.19
Table 14. Largest Barge
Name
Daily Barge
Loadout
(bushels)
%oJ
Total
Storage
(bushels)
%oj
Total
Other 6,279,000 26.55 135,091,144 30.78
Bunge Corporation 3,875,000 16.38 123,447,000 28.12
Archer Daniels Midland '4,285.000 18.12 44,785,635 10.20
Cargill Incorporated 2,999,000 12.68' 44,136,000 10.06
Cenex Harvest States Coop 1,040,000 4.40 25,136,000 5.73
Consolidated Grain & Barge 2,275,000 9.62 24,700,000 5.63
Continental Grain Company 1,974,000 8.35 21,635,327 4.93
Conagra Incorporated 462,000 1.95 14,763,000 3.36
Louis Dreyfus 205,000 0.87 2,678,000 0.61
Riceland Foods Incorporated 220,000 0.93 2,344,000 0.53
MFA Incorporated 40,000 0.17 226,000 0.05
Total 23,654,000 438,942,106
Table 15. Barge Loadout Illinois River
Name
Archer Daniels
Midland
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND CO
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND CO
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
Barge Loadout
Capacity
per Day (shared)
10P,000.00BU
150,000.00BU
150,000.00BU
500,000.00BU
25O,000.00BU
310,000.00BU
150,000.00BU
645,000.00BU
645,000.00BU
340,000.00BU
645,OOO.OOBU
645,000.00BU
Total Capacity, bushels: 32,727,000
Cargill Capacity, bushels: 8,890,000
Cargill Share: 27.16
City ST
FREDERICK IL
CREVECOEUR IL
PEORL^ IL
HAVANA IL
OTTAWA IL
MORRIS IL
PEKIN IL
HENRY IL
HENNEPIN IL
NAPLES IL
LACON IL
CHILLICOTHE IL
Storage^
Bushels
2,757,000
1,401,000
1,931,000
1,271,000
1,095,000
822,000
743,000
552,000
500,000
310,000
199,000
172,000
%oj
Total
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
CargUl Incorporated
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
Consolidated Grain
&
CONSOLIDATED
GRAIN & BARGE
CONSOLIDATED
GRAIN & BARGE
CONSOLIDATED
GRAIN & BARGE
Consolidated Grain
and Barge
200,OOO.OOBU vM^EY ^ 109,000
200,OOO.OOBU LA SALLE IL 80,000
Sum: 11,942,000 36.49
100,000.00BU FLORENCE IL
250,OOO.OOBU v^EY ^
lO0,000.00BU MEREDOSL\ IL
lOO.OOO.OOBU OTTAWA IL
100,000.00BU LOCKPORT IL
100,000.00BU HAVANNA IL
100,OOO.OOBU MORRIS IL
1,887,000
1,431,000
961,000
879,000
575,000
575,000
304,000
Sum: 6,612,000 20.20
120,000.00BU NAPLES IL 8.096,000
450,000.00BU HENNEPIN IL 1,257,000
450,000.00BU UTICA IL 1,005,000
50,000.00BU Peru IL
Sum: 10,358,000 31.65
Continental Grain
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN CO.
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
Farmer's Elevator
Company
Other
JERSEY COUNTY
GRAIN COMPANY
SOURS GRAIN
COMPANY
300,000.00fiU HENNEPIN IL
300,000.00BU SENECA IL
50,OOO.OOBU HAVANA IL
300,000.00BU LOCKPORT IL
50,000.00BU LACON IL
50,000.00BU BEARDSTOWN IL
300,000.00BU MORRIS
300,000.00BU
SPRING
VALLEY
50,000.00BU Seneca
IL
IL
IL
110,000
869,000
451,000
212,000
210,000
199,000
125,000
102,000
Sum: 2,278,000 6.96
100,000.00BU HARDIN IL 805,000
300,OOO.OOBU PEKIN IL 732,000
Sum: 1,537,000 4.7
Table 16. Barge Loadout Northern Illinois River
Name
Archer Daniels
Midland
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND CO
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
Cargill Incorporated
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
Total Capacity, bushels: 15,415,000
Cargill Capacity, bushels: 4,817,000
Cargill Share: 31.25
Barge Loadout
Capacity
perDay (shared)
City ST % ofTotal
Bushels •'
I50,OOO.OOBU CREVECOEUR IL
150,000.00BU PEORIA IL
250,000.00BU OTTAWA
310.000.00BU MORRIS
150.000.00BU PEKIN
645,000.00BU HENRY
645,OOO.OOBU HENNEPIN
645,000.00BU LACON
645,000.00BU CHILLICOTHE IL
200.000.00BU SPRING VALLEY IL
200.000.00BU LA SALLE IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
1,401,000
1.931.000
1,095,000
822,000
743,000
552,000
500.000
199,000
172,000
109,000
80,000
Sum: 7,604,000
250,000.00BU SPRING VALLEY IL 1,431,000
lOO.OOO.OOBU OTTAWA IL 879.000
lOO.OOO.OOBU LOCKPORT IL 575,000
49.33
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
Consolidated Grain &
CONSOLIDATED
GRAIN & BARGE
CONSOLIDATED
GRAIN & BARGE
Consolidated Grain and
Barge
Continental Grain
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN CO.
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
Farmer's Elevator
Company
Other
SOURS GRAIN
COMPANY
lOO.OOd.OOBU MORRIS IL 304,000
Sum: 3,189,000 20.69
450.000.00BU HENNEPIN IL 1,257,000
450,OOO.OOBU imCA IL 1,005,000
50,000.00BU Peni IL
Sum: 2,262,000
300.000.00BU HENNEPIN IL 110,000
300,OOO.OOBU SENECA IL
300,OOO.OOBU
50,000.00BU
300,OOO.OOBU
300,OOO.OOBU
50,OOO.OOBU
LOCKPORT IL
LACON IL
MORRIS IL
SPRING
VALLEY
Seneca
IL
IL
869,000
212,000
210,000
125,000
102,000
Sum: 1,628,000
300,OOO.OOBU PEKIN IL 732,000
Sum: 732,000
14.67
10.56
4.75
Table 17. Barge Loadout Missouri River
Name
Archer Daniels Midland
Barge Loadout
Capacity
per Day (shared)
Total Capacity, bushels: 40,562,554
Cargill Capacity, bushels: 927,000
Cargill Share: 2.29
City ST
Storage, % of
Bushels Total
ARCHER DANibLS
MIDLAND 200,000.00 BU ST LOUIS MO
Sum:
2,154,000
2,154,000 5.31
Bunge Corporation
BUNGE CORPORATION
BUNGE CORPORATION
Cenex Harvest States
45,000.00
45,000.00
BU
BU
BROWNVILLE
BROWNVILLE
NE
NE
Sum:
833,000
833,000
1,666,000 4.11
CENEX HARVEST STATES 90,000.00 BU KANSAS CITY MO
Sum:
4,307,000
4,307,000 10.62
Continental Grain
CONTINENTAL GRAIN
COMPANY
90,000.00 BU KC
(CHOTHAU)
MO
Sum:
927,000
927,000 2.29
MFA Incorporated
MFA INCORPORATED 40,000.00 BU JEFFERSON
MO
MO
Sum:
226,000
226,000 0.56
Other
BARTLEIT AND COMPANY 150,000.00 BU KANSAS CITY KS 10,083,000
BARTLETT AND COMPANY 50,000.00 BU ST JOSEPH MO 3,978,000
BARTLEIT AND COMPANY 50,000.00 BU WAVERLY MO 1,386,000
BARTLETT AND COMPANY 50,000.00 BU NEBRASKA
CITY
NE 1,020,000
COOP ASSN NO 1 32,000.00 BU SLATER MO 1,819,669
COOPERATIVE ASSN NO I 32,000.00 BU MIAMI MO 751,584
DEBRUCE GRAIN INC 100,000.00 BU NEBRASKA
CITY
NE 3,782,000
DILLER GRAIN CO INC
DILLER GRAIN CO INC
GLASGOW
COOPERATIVE ASSN
HAVEMAN GRAIN CO., INC.
rrALGRANI ELEVATOR CO
WfflTE CLOUD GRAIN
COMPANY
50,000.00 BU
50,000.00 BU
45,000.00 BU
50,000.00 BU
150,000.00 BU
25,000.00 BU
BROWNVILLE NE
BROWNVILLE NE
GLASGOW
312,449
312,449
MO 2,460,209
ROCK BLUFF
ST LOUIS
NE 254,194
MO 3,976,000
WfflTE CLOUD KS 1,147,000
Sum: 31,282,554 77.12
Table 18. Barge Loadout Ohio River
Name
Archer Daniels Midland
ADM/COUNTRYMARK. LLC
ADM/COUNTRYMARK, LLC
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND
ARCHER-DANIELS MIDLAND
Bunge Corporation
BUNGE CORPORATION
BUNGE CORPORATION
Cargtli Incorporated
CARGILL INCORPORATED
CARGILL INCORPORATED
CAROILL.INC
Conagra Incorporated
CONAGRA INC
Barge Loadout
Capacity
per Day (shared)
60.000.00 BU
200.000.00 BU
110,000.00 BU
110.000.00 BU
50.000.00 BU
55.000.00 BU
City
CINCINNATI
SILVER GROVE
EVANSVILLE
NEWBURGH
MOUND CITY
LEDBETTER
100.000.00 BU CAIRO
350.000.00 BU SHAWNEETOWN
100.000.00 BU EVANSVILLE
140.000.00 BU CINCINNATI
140.000 00 BU CINNCINNATl
12,000.00 BU HENDERSON
Total Capacit>', bushels: 32,717,962
Cargill Capacity, bushels: 4,432J27
Cargill Share: 13.55
ST
OH
KY
IN
IN
IL
KY
Sum:
IL
IL
Sum:
IN
OH
OH
Sum:
Storage,
Bushels
1.397.000
393,000
3,583.935
1.476.700
723.000
1,517.000
9,090,635
4,142,000
3.369.000
7,511.000
L94I.000
366,000
292.000
2,599,000
KY 3,611.000
Stan: 3,611^
% of
Total
27.78
22.96
7.94
11.04
Consolidated Grain &
CONSOLIDATED GRAIN & BARGE
CONSOLIDATED GRAIN & BARGE
CONSOLIDATED GRAIN & BARGE
CONSOLIDATED GRAIN & BARGE
CONSOLIDATED GRAIN & BARGE
CONSOLIDATED GRAIN & BARGE
CONSOLIDATED GRAIN & BARGE
CONSOLIDATED GRAIN & BARGE
Continental Grain
CONTINENTAL GRAIN COMPANY
200,000.00 BU
100.000.00 BU
120,OOO.OOBU
400,000.00 BU
100,000.00 BU
100,000.00 BU
50,000.00 BU
10,000.00 BU
MTVERNON IN
CINCINNATI OH
JEMRSONVILLE IN
MOUND CITY IL
AURORA
NORTH BEND
PADUCAH
HENDERSON
IN
OH
KY
KY
Sum:
2,440,000
1,724,000
1,398,000
1,204,000
663,000
256,000
225.000
163,000
8,073,000
100,000.00 BU MOUNT IN 1,833,327
Sum: 1,833^27
24.67
5.60
Table 19. Barge Loadout Upper Mississippi River
Name
Archer Daniels
Midland
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND CO
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND
Barge Loadout Capacity
per Day (shared)
120,000.00BU
30,000.00BU
200,000.00BU
275,000.00BU
120,000.00BU
City
WINONA
STPAUL
ST LOUIS
BURLINGTON
KEITHSBURG
SAVAGE
ALBANY
LOUISIANA
ST
Total Capacity, bushels: • 93^25,000
Cargill Capacity, bushels: 27,804,000
Cargill Share: 29.60
Storage, Bushels % of Total
M
M
M
lA
IL
Sum:
M
IL
M
6.44
Bunge Corporation
BUNGE
CORPORATION
BUNGE
CORPORATION
BUNGE
CORPORATION
BUNGE
CORPORATION
BUNGE
CORPORATION
200,OOO.OOBU
880,000.00BU
880,000.00BU
880,000.00BU
880,000.00BU
EAST HANNIBAL IL
309,000
2,204,000
2,154,000
998,000
383,000
6,048,000
9,276,000
4,947,000
2,636,000
2,303,000
1,171,000
20,333,000
1,223,000
1,036,000
684,000
Cargill Incorporated
AGRI GRAIN
MARKETING
AGRI GRAIN
MARKETING
AGRI GRAIN
200,OOO.OOBU
125,000.00BU
lOO.OOO.OOBU
LA GRANGE
MCGREGOR
BUFFALO
LACROSSE
M
Sum:
lA
lA
WI
21.65
MARKETING
AGRI GRAIN
MARKETING
CARGILL
INCORPORATED
Cenex Harvest States
CENEX HARVEST
STATES
CENEX HARVEST
STATES COOPS
CENEX HARVEST
STATES COOPS
CENEX HARVEST
STATES COOPS
HARVEST STATES
COOPERATIVES
Cohagra Incorporated
CONAGRAINC
CONAGRA INC
CONAGRA INC
CONAGRA INC
Continental Grain
CONTINENTAL
GRAfN COMPANY
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
CONTINENTAL
GRAIN COMPANY
Other
ALTAIR TRADING
CORP
lOO.OOO.OOBU
350,000.00BU
I50,000.00BU
70,000.00BU
70,000.00BU
I70,000.00BU
300.000.00BU
50,000.00BU
150,000.00BU
40.000.00BU
lO.OOO.OOBU
150,000.00BU
50,OOO.OOBU
125,0p0.00BU
25,OOO.OOBU
FULTON
SAVAGE
DAVENPORT
STPAUL
MINNEAPOLIS
WINONA
SAVAGE
ALTON
DUBUQUE
ST PAUL
PRAIRIE
SAVAGE
MUSCATINE
NEW BOSTON
OQUAWKA
IL
M
Sum:
lA
M
M
M
M
Sum:
IL
lA
M
WI
Sum:
M
lA
IL
Sum:
IL
571,000
17,359,000
20,873,000
4,795,000
1,400.000
1,339,000
506,000
641,000
8,681,000
3,385,000
2,183,000
1,509,000
73,000
7,150,000
5,432,000
1,257,000
242,000
6,931,000
739,000
22.22
9.24
7.61
7.38
COLUSA ELEVATOR
CO
COLUSA ELEVATOR
COMPANY
COLUSA ELEVATOR
COMPANY
GABE LOGSDON &
SONS INC
ITALGRANI
ELEVATOR CO
JERSEY COUNTY
GRAIN COMPANY
PATTISONBRO MS
RIVER TERM
URSA FARMERS
COOP CO
URSA FARMERS
COOP CO
URSA FARMERS
COOP CO
55,000.00BU
55,000.00BU
55,000.00BU
75.000.00BU
150.000.00BU
100,000.00BU
300,000.00BU
200,OOO.OOBU
200,000.00BU
200,000.00BU
FERRIS
NAUVOO
COLUSA
GREGORY
ST LOUIS
HARDIN
CLAYTON
MEYER
WARSAW
URSA
IL
IL
IL
M
M
IL
lA
IL
IL
IL
Sum:
357.000
2,783,000
1,299,000
2,778,000
3,976,000
805.000
7,488,000
2,746,000
810,000
128,000
234^09,000 25.46
Table 20, Largest U.S. Grain Storage Firms
Name
Barge
Loadout
(bushels)
%of.
Total
Ship Loadout
(bushels)
%oJ
Total
Storage
(bushels) Total
Other 6,279,000 26.55 4,206,666 20.32 5.090,191,808 71.54
Cargill Incorporated 2,999,000 12.68 6,924,000 33.44 439,868,644 6.18
Archer Daniels Midland 4,285,000 18.12 3,160,000 15.26 412,398,225 5.80
Conagra Incorporated 462,000 1.95 1,380,000 6.66 181,332,000 2.55
Bunge Corporation 3,875,000 16.38 • 800,000 3.86 158,567,000 2.23
Continental Grain
Company
1,974,000 8.35 2,690,000 12.99 155,402,327 ZIS
Cenex Harvest States
Coop
1,040,000 4.40" 655,000 3.16 133,386,000 1.87
Farmland Industries 0 0.00 0 0.00 118,819.000 . 1.67
Riceland Foods
Incorporated
220,000 0.93 0 0.00 98,201,000 1.38
The Andersons
Incorporated
0 0.00 0 0.00 78,547,389 1.10
General Mills Corporation 0 o.bo 640,000 3.09 65.793,000 0.92
Consolidated Grain &
Barge
2,275,000 9.62 0 0;00 57,241,950 0.80
Central Soya 0 0.00 0 0.00 52.013.000 0.73
The Scoular Company 0 0.00 0 0.00 30,061.073 0.42
MFA Incorporated 40,000 0.17 0 0.00 25,168.538 0.35
Topflight Grain
Cooperative 0 0.00
0 0.00 13.920,000 0.20
Louis Dreyfus 205.000 0.87 250,000 1.21 4.668.000 0.07
Total 23,654,000 20,705,666 7,115,578,954
